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At its core, contact tracing is a form of egocentric network analysis 
(ENA). One of the biggest obstacles for ENA is informant accuracy 
(i.e., amount of true contacts identified), which is even more 
prominent for interaction-based network ties because they often 
represent episodic relational events, rather than enduring relational 
states. This research examines the effect of informant accuracy 
on the spread of COVID-19 through an egocentric, agent-based 
model. Overall when the average person transmits COVID-19 to 1.62 
other people (i.e., the R0), they must be, on average, 75% accurate 
with naming their contacts. In higher transmission contexts (i.e., 
transmitting to at least two other people), the results show that 
multi-level tracing (i.e., contact tracing the contacts) is the only viable 
strategy. Finally, sensitivity analysis shows that the effectiveness 
of contact tracing is negatively impacted by the timing and overall 
percent of asymptomatic cases. Overall, the results suggest that 
if contact tracing is to be effective, it must be fast, accurate, and 
accompanied by other interventions like mask-wearing to drive down 
the average R0.
Keywords
Egocentric network analysis, Agent-based model, COVID-19, 
Contagion.
Issues regarding the reliability and validity of relational 
data have been a long concern for social network 
researchers (Perry et al., 2018), especially when such 
data are supposed to represent observable behavior 
(i.e., A interacted with B this week). And although 
there has been considerable research demonstrating 
various biases and cognitive limitations participants 
have when reporting their network ties (see, Smith 
et al., 2020, for a review), less work has demonstrated 
some of the more applied consequences of such 
issues. In other words, in what applied contexts 
should researchers take a deeper look at the out-
comes of informant accuracy?
One such applicable area where the reliability and 
validity of relational data are important is the practice 
of contact tracing. Contact tracing is a strategy 
used to help contain various infectious diseases that 
spread through interpersonal contact. Put simply, 
contact tracing is the process of retrospectively 
identifying persons who may have made interpersonal 
contact with a confirmed infectious individual (Eames 
and Keeling, 2003). The logic of contact tracing is 
straightforward: identify contacts who have had 
interactions with an infected patient and remove 
them from the social system to (hopefully) prohibit 
the further spread of the disease. Such a method 
has been credited as effective because it allows for 
the testing of at-risk contacts and this method also 
allows for the identifying of hotspots and clusters of 
diseases (Klinkenberg et al., 2006).
At its core, contact tracing is simply a form of 
egocentric network analysis (ENA). ENA is the study 
of individuals (i.e., egos) and people in the ego’s 
immediate social environment (i.e., alters; Perry et al., 
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2018). Conducting a reliable and valid ENA study is 
challenging, and there is a rich academic/applied 
literature dedicated to improving the rigor behind 
these efforts (Crossley et al., 2015; McCarty et al., 
2019; Perry et al., 2018). However, there has been 
scant research determining how varying levels of 
reliability and validity might influence how effective 
contact tracing can be at containing infectious 
diseases.
This research is organized as follows. First, we 
review the literature behind contact tracing and our 
key factor of interest: informant accuracy. Second, we 
set up the details behind the egocentric agent-based 
model, examining the effect of informant accuracy 
and multi-level tracing on the spread of Severe 
Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-
CoV-2), the biologic strain of coronavirus that causes 
the illness known as COVID-19. Third, we conduct 
a sensitivity analysis to examine the impact of the 
timing of the tracing and the percent of asymptomatic 
cases in the population. Finally, we discuss the results 
in terms of the wider literature on contact tracing and 
ENA.
A brief review of contact tracing
Contact tracing is a well-known type of social network 
intervention for understanding how infectious diseases 
spread (Valente, 2010). Indeed, rudimentary versions 
were even used during waves of the bubonic plague 
in the sixteenth century (Cohn and O’Brien, 2020). 
Contact tracing has been employed in infectious 
diseases caused by various pathogens (e.g., STIs, 
Macke and Maher, 1999; SARS: Donnelly et al., 
2003; TB: Mandalakas et al., 2017). Consequently, it 
is considered efficient at reducing the prevalence of 
infections, especially when dealing with an isolated 
number of cases (e.g., STIs) or toward novel forms of 
viruses (Eames et al., 2010).
Although contact tracing is generally considered 
a useful means of gathering potential transmission 
data, it does not always suffice, by itself, as a control 
measure to contain a given epidemic (Eames et al., 
2010). Moreover, the effectiveness of contact tracing 
is dependent on the transmission dynamics of the 
outbreak (Klinkenberg et al., 2006) and on the timing 
of the tracing itself (Kretzschmar et al., 2020). For 
example, Cheng et al. (2020) conducted a contact 
tracing assessment toward COVID-19. They found 
that, due to the high transmission rate before and 
near an individual’s symptom onset, contact tracing 
would be inadequate on its own. Instead, contact 
tracing should be at least implemented with other 
interventional strategies, such as social distancing 
and mask-wearing. Likewise, a recent stochastic 
transmission model by Hellewell et al. (2020) sought 
to investigate the potential efficacy of contact tracing 
and isolation of cases toward COVID-19. They did 
so through a variety of simulated outbreaks and 
ranging their R0’s and transmission before symptom 
onset percentage. They found that contact tracing 
probability (i.e., odds that the tracing happens) must 
be high (i.e., 80%+) to control COVID-19 transmission.
Additionally, agent-based models (ABMs) have 
been used to simulate contact tracing data. Kucharski 
et al. (2020a, b) employed ABM to simulate a variety 
of scenarios involving responses to COVID-19 (e.g. 
no control measures, self-isolation away from the 
household, quarantining, self-isolation in the house-
hold). The authors found that a combined approach 
of isolating symptomatic cases and contact tracing 
the contacts of positive cases reduced the spread of 
COVID-19 when compared to individually implementing 
measures. Furthermore, the authors note that in 
an instance where asymptomatic cases were high, 
many contacts would need to be traced and tested 
to consider transmission at a higher network level (i.e., 
transmission from secondhand contact).
At the end of the day, contact tracing is theo-
retically useful for understanding contagion dynamics 
and practically useful for mitigating the spread of 
infectious diseases, Additionally, as Eames et al. 
(2010) point out, collecting contact tracing data is not 
an easy feat. It requires significant material resources 
to compensate tracers and it requires informational 
resources to train tracers to overcome some of 
the many obstacles to collect reliable and valid 
contact network data. Overcoming these obstacles 
is important because the effectiveness of contact 
tracing is only as good as the data collected.
Informant accuracy: how do people 
remember their contacts?
Because contact tracing is a form of ENA, it is prone 
to a host of issues regarding reliability and validity (for 
a review, see Perry et al., 2018). For contact tracing, 
perhaps the most sensitive issue for data collection 
is informant accuracy, the difference between an 
ego’s perceptions of their network and their actual 
network (Bernard et al., 1984). When researchers 
compare and contrast between perceived and actual 
networks, these analyses are commonly known as 
accuracy studies, perhaps most notably popularized 
by Bernard, Kilworth, and Sailer, otherwise known 
as the BKS studies (for a brief review, see Bernard 
et al., 1981). The general theme of the BKS studies 
is that individuals’ self-reports of their network 
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behaviors do not align very well with their actual 
behaviors. Moreover, the network structures of self-
reported and actual behavioral networks differ from 
one another as well (Quintane, 2012). Although self-
reported data on perceived network contacts may 
be useful as cognitive social structures in its pure 
form (Krackhardt, 1987), for contact tracing, it is clear 
that the minimization of the error between the two is 
a central concern. Indeed, since accumulation of a 
handful of accuracy studies, there has been debate, 
research, and theoretical moves to try and figure out 
why there is such a discrepancy between perceived 
and actual contacts (e.g., Corman and Scott, 1994; 
Pilny et al., 2017), how to mitigate some of these 
biases in data collection (Kogovšek et al., 2002), 
and how to account for informant (in) accuracy in 
inferential network analyses (Butts, 2003).
Nevertheless, it is important to understand why 
individuals have trouble recalling network ties in 
the first place. For starters, humans do not store 
information like network contacts in a vacuum, they 
are primarily organized through cognitive schemas 
that cluster information based on how ties are related 
to one another (McCarty et al., 2019). For instance, 
Brashears and Quintane (2015) found that alters 
tend to be better remembered in terms of common 
group membership (e.g., role relations like family, 
work, neighbors) and ‘chunked’ structures like triads. 
Moreover, contacts are better remembered if they 
are repeated and represent long-term, consistent 
interactions (Freeman et al., 1987). Likewise, contacts 
that are not very popular themselves (e.g., less central) 
are often difficult to remember than popular ones 
(Marin, 2004). Perhaps more importantly for contact 
tracing, individuals whom the ego feels less close and 
interacts with less frequently are more prone to recall 
issues (Brewer, 2000). The key implication here is that 
there are certain network ties that are more likely to 
be forgotten.
For extracting contact tracing data, all of the above 
issues may be present, but may be even further 
complicated by the fact that such data represents the 
extraction of relational events, not relational states. A 
relational event can be defined as a ‘discrete event 
generated by a social actor and directed toward one 
or more targets’ (Butts, 2008, p. 159), while relational 
states can be viewed as ‘continuously persistent 
relationships between nodes’ (Borgatti et al., 2013, 
p. 3). The transmission of COVID-19 does not require 
an established relational state between dyads, a 
simple relational event will suffice.
The key difference is the nature of the tie: relational 
events are episodic, while relational states are more 
enduring. For instance, some psychological theories 
of recall generally find that some information (e.g., 
interpersonal contacts) are better remembered if they 
are encoded in a meaningful way. For instance, if a 
relational event occurs with somebody where there 
is no meaningful relational state (e.g., friendship, 
work relationship) or other cue of information, such 
an event may be more difficult to recall because 
the episodic event may be harder to encode in an 
elaborative (i.e., meaningful) fashion (e.g., Craik and 
Lockhart, 1972). Relational events divorced from 
relational states or other helpful memory schemas 
like elevator conversations, interactions with waiters/
bartenders, fellow parent at the park, etc. might lend 
themselves more prone to recall problems.
Moreover, individual-level differences can also 
exacerbate similar informant accuracy problems. In 
other words, it could be characteristics about the 
ego, rather than the alter, that can influence informant 
accuracy. A substantial amount of research has de-
monstrated that factors like gender (Breashears et al., 
2016), age (Hsieh, 2014), mood (Hlebec and Ferligoj, 
2001), and occupation (Marineau et al., 2018) can 
influence network recall as well.
As such, previous ENA research has demonstrated 
that informant accuracy problems exist and influ-
enced by characteristics of both the ego and the 
alter. Poised with this phenomenon, we consider how 
informant accuracy impacts the spread of COVID-19 
when contact tracing is implemented. Important 
questions like ‘how accurate does the contact tracing 
need to be to have any effect?’ and ‘at what point do 
we start to see diminishing returns?’ can be answered 
by analyzing the relationship between informant 
accuracy and viral spread. Moreover, contact tracing 
requires participants to engage in the unpleasant 
task of going into quarantine. Here, there is also a 
challenge to be economical and try to require as few 
as people as possible to go under quarantine. As 
such, we ask:
R1: What is the relationship between informant 
accuracy during contact tracing and (a) the spread 
of COVID-19 and (b) number of quarantines?
Multi-level tracing using snowball 
sampling
In addition to the effect of informant accuracy, it is 
important to ask if there are any probable and useful 
alternative strategies for collecting contact tracing 
data. Because contact tracing is a respondent-driven 
technique, we consider how a snowball sample may 
be a useful strategy for finding potential infectious 
contacts (Johnson, 1990). In the context of social 
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network research, Borgatti et al. (2013) defined 
snowball sampling as the process of gathering 
network data ‘on any qualifying actor with a tie to any 
actor already selected, up to K waves or until quotas 
or cost limits are reached’ (p. 34). Such a technique 
has been used in other studies attempting to gain 
access to at-risk populations. For instance, Kendall 
et al. (2008) were able to get up to five waves of data 
for an HIV at-risk population in Brazil.
In the context of COVID-19, a qualified actor is 
someone who has tested positive for the virus. 
When the actor is interviewed for contact tracing 
data, the practitioner will elicit from the actor a set 
of alters and will inform those alters to get tested 
and quarantine. This traditional method can be 
described as first-level contact tracing as it revolves 
around making use of the first wave of data from 
the initial infected individual. Second-level contact 
tracing would simply repeat the process for the set 
of initial alters, which is to say it would contact trace 
the contacts. A practitioner would then elicit alters 
from these contacts and require them to get tested 
and quarantine for the time being, a strategy used in 
the early stages of the COVID-19 outbreak in South 
Korea (Schneider et al., 2020). Third-level contact 
tracing would repeat the same process for the new 
alters and so on.
One of the key advantages of snowball sampling 
is accessing hidden and ‘hard to reach’ populations 
(Browne, 2005), such as those individuals who are 
spreading COVID-19 but may not yet know it. In this 
sense, it allows researchers to work backward to 
catch up on the viral diffusion process. As such, we 
ask:
R2: What is the relationship between multi-level 
tracing and (a) the spread of COVID-19 and (b) the 
number of quarantines?
Finally, informant accuracy and multi-level tracing 
may be interdependent on their effectiveness at 
mitigating the spread of COVID-19. That is, while 
they may have main effects by themselves, they 
can be dependent in complex ways. For instance, 
different levels tracing may have different thresholds 
of informant accuracy to contain the spread. To our 
knowledge, there is no empirical work analyzing 
the relationship between informant accuracy and 
different levels of tracing. As such, we ask our third 
research question:
R3: How do informant accuracy and multi-
level contact tracing interact to influence the (a) 
the spread of COVID-19 and (b) the number of 
quarantines?
Methods
An egocentric agent-based model
Agent-based models (ABMs) are constructed to 
‘simulate simultaneously multiple agents, or actors, 
who behave in ways to that impact one another’ 
(Larson, 2012, p. 84). They are particularly useful 
for understanding how simple rules guiding agents’ 
behavior or other manipulations of input factors can 
influence the emergence of complex social structures 
(Corman, 1996). ABMs are very common in public 
health and epidemiology, where the goal is usually 
to create models to understand infectious disease 
dynamics that can help inform policy and responses 
to epidemics (e.g., Epstein, 2009).
An ‘egocentric’ ABM does not radically depart 
from the basic mechanics of social simulation 
because ABMs already typically focus on interactions 
between agents. However, the current egocentric 
approach puts special emphasis on the ENA portion 
as factors that can be manipulated (i.e., informant 
accuracy and level of tracing). In the current model, 
egocentric interaction networks are collected during 
each iteration (i.e., a day), allowing to user to inspect 
any network-interaction history of any agent.
What follows is a description of the key building 
blocks of the current ABM, which we call ConTrace (see 
Fig. 1 for visualization). Following Hammond’s (2015) 
suggestions for best practices of reporting ABMs, 
we specify the following: Properties, Actions, Rules, 
Time, and Environment (PARTE). Documenting the 
details of any ABM can sometimes be overwhelming. 
As such, what follows is an abbreviated summary. 
More fine-grained details can be found in an online 
appendix1, including additional robustness checks, 
model verifications, and the ConTrace model in 
NetLogo.
Basic overview
The developed ABM of infectious disease tracing and 
quarantine is based on a slightly modified susceptible-
exposed-infectious-removed (SEIR) model with an ex-
pansion by adding the procedures of contact tracing 
and quarantine. The SEIR model, an expansion of 
SIR model, divided the population into four groups: 
(i) susceptible, (ii) exposed, (iii) infectious, and (iv) 
recovered. Individuals in a population could go through 
all the four phases during an epidemic outbreak.




Figure 2 illustrates the structure and flow of the 
model. Ovals represent human agents and rhombuses 
represent model decisions. A ‘susceptible’ contact 
moves into ‘exposed’ when they have made contact 
with somebody that has COVID-19. Exposed contacts 
now have the ability to be traced when the previous 
infectious agent becomes symptomatic, goes to the 
doctor, and gets contact traced. The odds that the 
exposed contact must go under quarantine will depend 
on the level of informant accuracy. If the exposed 
contact does not get traced, they remain in the system. 
All the while and depending on the transmission and 
asymptomatic rate, they may continue to spread 
COVID-19 if infected, and undergo contact tracing 
when symptoms develop (i.e., incubation period is 
over).
Properties
Properties represent the mutable and immutable 
attributes of agents in the system, which can also 
be observable and unobservable to other agents. 
In the present ABM, only one type of agent, people, 
is used. However, the agents are classified into six 
groups – (i) susceptible, (ii) non-infected contacts, 
(iii) presymptomatic contacts, (iv) asymptomatic 
contacts, (v) patients, and (vi) recovered – based on 
four attributes (see Table 1). The classification is made 
by considering both the traditional grouping in the 
previous studies and current modeling functions. For 
example, it is necessary to separate people who have 
never been exposed to the disease and who have 
been exposed but not infected. We regard the former 
as ‘susceptible people’ and the latter as ‘non-infected 
contacts’. They both remain susceptible to the 
infectious disease but only the exposed contacts may 
be traced and quarantined. We define the ‘contact’ 
state of the ‘patients’ and ‘recovered people’ as false 
even though they were exposed to the disease. This 
arbitrary state setting allows us to focus on tracing 
and quarantining the contacts in the model. The 
deaths of the disease do not have a category as they 
disappear from the model.
The agents are created in the setup procedure 
of the model. When setting up the model, a defined 
number of agents are created and randomly 
distributed in the simulation window. All of them are 
susceptible people except one presymptomatic 
individual. To help visualize the process, we color 
code the susceptible people as green, the non-
infected contacts as magenta, the presymptomatic 
and asymptomatic individuals as yellow, the patients 
as orange and dark red, and the recovered people 
as blue (see Fig. 3). When an agent is isolated, i.e., 
Figure 1: NetLogo interface of ConTrace.
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a patient, or quarantined, i.e., a contact, its shape 
changes from a person to a sheltered person.
Actions
The catalog of behaviors that each agent performs 
within the simulation is actions. There are three basic 
actions that the agents take in the simulation. The first 
is mobility, which refers to how agents move around 
in the environments. Like previous SEIR simulations, 
we assume agents move a certain distance in a 
random direction. The second is interaction, which 
assumes that agents are interacting with one another 
in a way that allows for potential transmission of 
COVID-19. For instance, John Hopkins University 
defines contacts as sustained interaction within 
six feet for at least 15 min (Gurley, 2020). Through 
being mobile and interacting, agents can change 
the properties of other agents to represent the viral 
transmission. Consequentially, this has a change 
on the environment because infected agents will 
eventually remove themselves from the system and 
quarantine, where they will either become immune 
or die.
Figure 2: Conceptual flow chart of ConTrace.
Table 1. Six groups of agents.
Susceptible? Contact? Infected? Symptom?
Susceptible ✓ X X X
Non-infected contacts ✓ ✓ X X
Presymptomatic and asymptomatic contacts X ✓ ✓ X
Patients X X ✓ ✓




The resulting contact network is fixed, meaning that 
interactions do not follow a stochastic model for new 
selection of ties as in the case of inferential network 
models (e.g., a stochastic actor-oriented model): 
the placement of the agents is random. However, 
because the random placements of objects in a fixed 
space tends to produce clusters in what is commonly 
known as the clustering illusion (Gilovich, 1991, 
pp. 19-20), what is emerges is a typical ‘small-world’ 
world network with an above-average clustering 
coefficient. Users can also specify a ‘traveler’ 
percentage to manipulate the amount of agents that 
travel to random portion of the space, unrestricted 
by their current mobility settings. The purpose of this 
function is to introduce potential super-spreaders that 
travel more across the space to make more contacts 
across clusters (i.e., brokering). Indeed, the current 
default setting (mobility = 2 and travelers = 10%) 
tended to produce a contact network that could not 
reject the assumption that it comes from a power-
law distribution (GOF = 0.049, p = 0.67) according to 
Clauset et al. (2009) distribution comparisons.
In general, the lower the mobility settings, the 
more clustered the contact network will be because 
the agents are more restricted to their initial local 
placements. Likewise, the higher the traveler settings, 
the more centralized the network will be until that 
value reaches 50%. That is, after 50%, the majority of 
agents will have unrestricted mobility. For instance, if 
set at 100%, a Bernoulli random contact network will 
be extracted because 100% of the agents are placed 
at random areas of the map after each interaction 
(Table 2).
Rules
Rules are the heart of any ABM. They define ‘how 
agents choose an action, update properties, and 
interact with each other and their environment’ 
(Hammond, 2015, p. 176). Given we aim to investigate 
the effect of contact tracing, we begin with the basic 
SEIR rules followed by the inclusion of contact tracing 
rules.
Basic SEIR rules Before articulating specific rules, 
the following assumptions are made:
•	 We assume agents’ backgrounds, such as 
age, gender, occupation, health history, etc., 
are uniform as these features should not deter-
mine whether they should be traced or quar-
antined.
•	 We assume agents’ mobilities are uniform to 
simplify the model.
•	 We assume patients, when under quarantine, 
are so well isolated that they do not infect other 
people in this model.
Figure 3: Properties of agents in ConTrace.
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•	 We assume the recovered people are fully im-
mune to the disease as we focus on the effect of 
quarantine during one epidemic outbreak event.
The basic SEIR model rules are set as below in 
each tick, which we interpret as a full day:
•	 All agents move a certain distance in a random 
direction, unless a traveler percentage is set.
•	 Each presymptomatic or asymptomatic ego de-
fines all susceptible people and unquarantined 
non-infected alters within its infection radius as 
its contacts (Fig. 4) and record these agents’ IDs 
in its egocentric contact-history list. At a trans-
mission rate, the presymptomatic ego infects 
one of these contacts and records the infected 
agent’s ID in its infection-history list.
•	 If the presymptomatic individuals pass the in-
cubation period, they become patients and are 
immediately isolated.
•	 If the patients pass the disease period, they ei-
ther recover and become immune, or die at the 
fatality rate.
•	 The asymptomatic individuals have no symp-
toms. Unless they are traced and quarantined, 
they infect the susceptible people and non-in-
fected contacts within their infection radius. They 
become recovered and immune after 14 days.
The main rule differences between our models 
and other SEIR models are that the presymptomatic 
and asymptomatic individuals are the only agents 
who infect others.
Contact tracing rules Since all presymptomatic 
individuals have a constantly updated contact-history 
and infection-history in this model, when they enter 
the patient phase, we can trace all their contacts and 
then quarantine part of or all the contacts. The tracing 
rules in each day are set as below:
Figure 4: Visualization of an infection 
radius as an indicator of an ego’s 
contacts.
Table 2. Typical contact network from the simulation.
Distribution Outliers
Nodes = 1000 
Mean degree = 14.79 
SD degree = 8.28 
Skewness = 1.49 
Kurtosis = 2.58 
Clustering coef. = 0.20 
Nodes = 1000 
Mean degree = 14.91 
SD degree = 3.92 
Skewness = 0.15 
Kurtosis = 0.14 
Clustering coef. = 0.01 
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•	 Identify the new patients and generate a full 
contact list based on the contact-history of all 
these new patients. The contacts in this list are 
regarded as the 1st-level contact.
•	 Examine the ‘infected’ status of the 1st-level 
contacts, if any presymptomatic or asympto-
matic individuals are found, trace their con-
tacts using their contact-history and generate 
the next level contact list, regarded as the 
2nd-level contacts. We found some contacts 
could have been included in the 1st-level con-
tact list, because a person may be counted as 
the contact by more than one patient. If this 
happens, we exclude the contacts who have 
been included in the 1st-level contact list.
•	 Examine the ‘infected’ status of 2nd-level con-
tacts, if any presymptomatic or asymptomatic 
individuals are found, trace their contacts using 
their contact-history and generate the 3rd-lev-
el contact list. Exclude the contacts who have 
been included in the 2nd-level contact list.
•	 Repeat the above procedures until all contacts 
are traced.
In the model, we can test the effect of quarantine 
up to different contact levels. The quarantine rules are 
specified below:
•	 Calculate the total number of contacts at a 
certain level based on the particular contact 
list.
•	 Use the total number and the defined quaran-
tine rate to calculate the number of contacts to 
be quarantined. If the number has a decimal, 
round down the number.
•	 Randomly choose and quarantine the number 
of contacts in the list.
When quarantining beyond 1st-level contacts, 
we identify the presymptomatic and asymptomatic 
individuals from the quarantined agents, trace their 
contacts, calculate the number of contacts to be 
quarantined in the same way as stated above, and 
then quarantine that number of the contacts.
Time
Time refers to the unit of analysis representing a 
passage of time. Operationally, it is usually represented 
by terms such as ‘ticks’, ‘iterations’, or ‘rounds’. In the 
current simulation, a ‘tick’, for interpretation, represents 
a 24-hr day. Moving from day 1 to day 2, the model 
is put into action. What happens on day 2 will have 
implications for what happens on day 3 and so on. 
For instance, if a contact is infected on day 33, the 
Figure 5: Contact tracing and quarantine procedure flow.
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incubation period of the contact will be cumulated 
when day 34 begins.
Environment
Finally, the environment represents the geometric 
space and the components in the background. The 
current simulation is defined by (i) size of the space 
(i.e., world resolution) and (ii) number of agents. In 
other words, agents are moving and interacting with 
one another in an open space, defined by how big it 
is and how many other agents are also included.
Model verification
The developed model is verified in three ways. First, 
we carefully go through the model procedures to 
ensure the conceptual rules are properly translated 
into the programming codes. Secondly, we compare 
our data on susceptible, infected, and recovered 
groups with the data from the classic epidemic models 
and confirm that our model can produce a typical 
epidemic data pattern for these people groups. Third, 
we consult with experts in Public Health to ensure the 
model elements and assumptions are appropriate.
Once the model is verified, we run a series of 
one-factor-at-a-time (OFAT) tests (Ten Broeke et al., 
2016) to validate the model and calibrate the following 
two emerging parameters: (i) number of contacts per 
person and (ii) the basic reproduction number (R0) 
of COVID-19. Additional details on these tests are 
included in the Online Appendix2, the main goal is 
to find settings by exploring reasonable values with 
respect to the transmission rate, population size, 
and world resolution that would reproduce typical 
outcomes related to interaction contacts in the 
social network analysis literature and R0 (i.e., average 
number of people an infected person infects) in the 
epidemiological literature.
After calibrating our model, we found that, when 
the world resolution is 30 × 30 with a population size 
of 1,000, an agent with an infection radius of 4 may 
have 14 to 15 contacts, which somewhat reflects 
the average contacts in the USA and European 
countries reported by social network and tracing 
studies (e.g., Del Valle et al., 2007; Mossong et al., 
2008; Rothwell, 2020). However, there is uncertainty 
regarding the true R0 value of COVID-19 (Liu et al., 
2020a, b). As such, we report our testing results for 
three situations.
R0 manipulation
Based on a meta-analysis of COVID-19 R0 estimation 
studies, Liu et al. (2020a, b) conclude that the best-
guessed estimation seems to be a number between 
two and three. Several studies seem to vary on the 
lower and higher end of that range. For instance, a 
number of studies have found estimated the typical 
R0 to be somewhere near 2.20 (see Table 3). Thus, in 
situation one, we proceed with settings that produce 
an average R0 of 2.11. However, some studies have 
estimated the R0 to be slightly higher at 2.50 (Imai et al., 
2020), 2.55 (Majumder and Mandl, 2020), and 2.68 
(Wu et al., 2020). As such, we produce a second 
situation that produces R0 values at an average of 
2.56 and can interpret these settings as the higher-
end R0 context.
However, in these two contexts, it is assumed 
that COVID-19 is spreading with little public health 
interventions to slow down the spread. Given the 
rise of measures like mask-wearing, we include 
a third situation which assumes a similar type of 
intervention. For instance, Li et al.’s (2020b) simulation 
suggests that if about half the population is regularly 
wearing masks, the R0 can drop to between 1.60 
and 1.70. As such, we modified the transmission 
rate to produce a third situation of an average R0 of 
1.62 (see Table 3).
Manipulated input variables
Informant accuracy
To manipulate informant accuracy, we simply adjust 
the ‘%-contacts-quarantined rate’. For instance, 
when a presymptomatic patient (i.e., ego) finally feels 
their symptoms and becomes sick, we assume they 
get contact traced and their contacts (i.e., alters) are 
told to immediately quarantine for 14 days. To add 
heterogeneity to this manipulation, the set percentage 
is the mean of a normal distribution (SD = 5%) and a 
value is drawn from this distribution.
The user can also manipulate false positives. In 
this case false positive mean that an agent being 
contact traced names an agent not on their contact 
list to go under quarantine. Because people tend to 
error less with false positives (Bernard et al., 1982), 
we set the rate to be drawn at a normal distribution 
with a mean of 10% (SD = 5%). The online appendix 
reports results ranging from 0 to 30%.
2The online appendix also details a typical infection net-
work, which closely mirrors a core-periphery infection 
structure. The over-dispersion parameter (k) is 0.14, in line 





To manipulate the level of contact tracing, we analyze 
1st, 2nd, and 3rd-level waves of a snowball sample 
for each ego that is infectious after their incubation 
period. 1st-level tracing represents the traditional 
baseline approach. Infectious egos are contact traced 
and their alters are quarantined. In 2nd-level tracing, 
the alters of initial set of alters are traced as well and 
they are correspondingly quarantined. Finally, in the 
3rd-level tracing, the alters from the second wave are 
traced as well and then quarantined (see Fig. 6).
Table 3. Three contexts of model testing and selected previous estimations.
Current model situations
Situation Average R0 Context
S1 1.62 Public health intervention like mask-wearing
S2 2.11 R0 near lower end of best estimations, no public health intervention
S3 2.56 R0 near higher end of best estimations, no public health intervention
Previous R0 estimates
R0 Citation Context
2.20 Li et al. (2020) Wuhan; January 22, 2020
2.20 Riou and Althaus (2020) China and overseas; January 18, 2020
2.24 Zhao et al. (2020) China; January 10-14, 2020
2.28 Zhang et al. (2020) Diamond Cruise Ship, February, 2020
2.35 Kucharski et al. (2020a) Wuhan; January-February, 2020
2.50 Imai et al. (2020) Wuhan, January 18, 2020
2.55 Majumder and Mandl (2020) Wuhan, December 8, and January 26, 2020
2.68 Wu et al. (2020) Wuhan; December 31-January, 28, 2020
2.90 Liu et al. (2020) China and overseas; January 23, 2020
Figure 6: Levels of contact tracing.
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Outcome of interest: prevalence and 
quarantines
There are a variety of outcomes researchers can 
measure to gauge the severity of an epidemiological 
outbreak (Rainwater-Lovett et al., 2016). For our 
purposes, we are most interested in strategies for 
containment that would prevent the need for herd 
immunity. As such, prevalence, which is simply the 
percentage of total infections in a population, is used 
as the key outcome. There is no precise rule-of-
thumb for a critical value of prevalence but obviously, 
the lower, the better3.
However, low prevalence may come at the cost 
of excess quarantine orders. To account for this, 
we also look at the number of quarantines that 
were administered because of the contact tracing. 
This could roughly be interpreted as a measure of 
efficiency because the ideal strategy would be to 
have the lowest infection prevalence paired with the 
least amount of quarantine orders. For instance, 
if everybody just quarantined all the time, it would 
prohibit the spread of the disease. However, in real-
life, that would not be an ideal policy as excessive 
quarantines would come at drastic social (e.g., 
isolation) and economic costs (e.g., halt in economic 
output) (e.g., Elmer and Stadtfeld, 2020). Indeed, this 
number can even go over 100% because somebody 
can be quarantined more than once if they are listed 
as a contact multiple times over the duration of the 
simulation.
Analysis procedures
The model (ConTrace) is created using NetLogo 6.1.1 
(Wilensky, 1999) and is available for download in the 
online appendix. For informant accuracy, we run from 
0 (i.e. basic SEIR model) to 100 percent informant 
accuracy, increasing the value in increments of five 
(e.g., 0, 5, 10, etc.). For each value, the simulation is 
run 30 times. Finally, we repeat the process for 1st, 
2nd, and 3rd-level contact tracing and for when the 
R0 values are 1.62, 2.11, and 2.56. This results in 5,400 
simulations to answer R1, R2, and R3. The median 
values of prevalence and number of quarantines are 
the key outcomes of interest.
Results
The three situations (S1, S2, and S3) represent 
estimates on the spread of COVID-19 using three 
different R0 values. S1 represents the lowest spread 
condition where the average R0 is 1.62. This R0 
assumes that some sort of public health intervention 
like mask-wearing is in place (Li et al., 2020a, b). On 
the other hand, we manipulate two different R0 values 
between two and three, the best range estimates 
of the typical R0 of COVID-19 (Liu et al., 2020a, b). 
In the lower-end situation (S2), the average R0 value 
is 2.11. In the higher-end situation (S3), the average 
R0 value is 2.56. The main effects of informant 
accuracy are plotted in Figure 7 and the main effects 
of contact tracing level are plotted in Figure 8. To 
understand how these two factors interact, the three-
way interaction (informant accuracy, level of contact 
tracing, and situation) is plotted in Figure 9.
R1: Impact of informant accuracy
Because collecting egocentric data is challenging, R1 
asked how informant accuracy would influence the 
spread of COVID-19. Figure 7 plots the main effect 
of informant accuracy across each situation. Two 
key trends emerge. First, there seems to be a clear 
linear trend: the higher the informant accuracy, the 
less prevalent COVID-19 is and the less people have 
to quarantine. Second, the steepness of the slope 
depends on R0 in each situation. That is, the lower the 
R0, the less the accurate the informant needs to be.
For instance, to get at under 10% prevalence, 
when the R0 = 1.62, a patient only needs to be 
45% accurate with their contacts. However, when 
the R0 = 2.11, that patient needs to be at least 75% 
accurate. Moreover, this context comes at a cost 
of quarantining more people as well (near 40%). 
When the R0 = 2.56, informant accuracy has less of 
an impact. For instance, even with 100% informant 
accuracy, about half will have to go under quarantine.
R2: Impact of contact tracing level
R2 asked what impact multi-level contact tracing 
would have assuming a traditional snowball design. 
3Fine et al. (2011), for example, define critical level of infec-
tion prevalence for herd immunity to develop (Hc) as a func-







Based on this equation, the critical prevalence level (Hc) 
for the average-context spread condition (R0 = 2.11) would 
be 52.60%. Likewise, the crucial prevalence level for the 
high-context spread condition (R0 = 2.56) would be 60.93%. 
Finally, for the context assuming mask-wearing, we would 
assume a critical level (R0 = 1.62) of 38.27%.
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Figure 7: Main effect of informant accuracy.
To look at the main effect of level of contact tracing, 
Figure 8 plots the average prevalence and quarantine 
values across each of the three situations. The clear 
theme that emerges is that are significant differences 
in prevalence and quarantines between 1st and 2nd-
level tracing, but smaller different between 2nd and 
3rd.
However, there is one caveat. There appears to be 
only small differences in prevalence, but significant 
differences in quarantines when comparing situations 
where the R0 = 2.11 and where the R0 = 2.56. That is, 
overall, the main effect of multi-level tracing appears 
in the context of S1, when the R0 = 1.62.
R3: Interaction
Figure 9 plots the main results across the interaction 
between informant accuracy and level of contact 
tracing. Overall, this graph tells a much more 
complete story. The three situations are separated by 
color: blue lines represent 1st-level tracing, red lines 
represent 2nd-level tracing, and green lines represent 
3rd-level tracing. The two outcomes are distinguished 
by line type: solid lines represent prevalence and 
dashed lines represent quarantines. The Y-axis 
represent percent of the population with respect 
to these two outcomes. Quarantines can go over 
100% because an agent can be quarantined more 
than once (e.g., after their 14-day quarantine is over, 
they can be traced again if they made contact with a 
different infected agent). Finally, informant accuracy is 
plotted on the X-axis.
To begin at answering R3, we will look at 1st level 
contact tracing across each context and see how 
prevalence and quarantines (Y-axis) differs across levels 
of network accuracy (X-axis). Overall, the results are 
contingent on the transmission dynamics of COVID-19. 
When the R0 = 1.62, a key inflection point emerges at 
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Figure 8: Main effect of level of contact tracing.
Figure 9: Interaction between informant accuracy and level of contact tracing.
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about 75% informant accuracy with prevalence at 
under 5% with less than 20% of the population having 
to go under quarantine. When the R0 = 2.11 and the 
R0 = 2.56, there really exists no viable strategy for 1st-
level contact tracing. Even at 100% informant accuracy, 
the outbreak is not contained as vast majority of agents 
end up contracting COVID-19, even when most agents 
have to go under quarantine at least once. In other 
words, it is the worst of both worlds: heavy infection 
rates and lots of quarantine mandates.
Overall, 2nd and 3rd-level tracing look striking 
similar. For instance, when R0 = 1.62 for 2nd and 
3rd-level tracing, the key inflection point seems to 
drop to 45% informant accuracy to obtain levels 
of prevalence under 5% with less than 20% of the 
population having to go under quarantine. In other 
words, patients only have to only be about half right 
about their contacts if those contacts are traced 
as well. When R0 = 2.11, similar critical informant 
accuracy level rise to about 75% for both strategies. 
However, when R0 = 2.56, 2nd-level tracing needs to 
be about 90% accurate for any viable results, but 
can dip to about 75% informant accuracy without 
needing too many excessive quarantines (~20%) if 
3rd-level tracing is used.
Summary of results
In light of these results, we see three general themes, 
all revolving around a critical value of 75%, but in 
different contexts:
1. Traditional 1st-level contract tracing is only re-
ally effective when other interventions are tak-
ing place like mask-wearing to drive down the 
R0 near 1.62. In that case, patients need to be, 
on average, 75% accurate in naming their con-
tacts.
2. When the R0 is at the lower end of between two 
and three (e.g., 2.11), 2nd-level tracing may be a 
viable strategy. In this case, patients will have to 
be, on average, 75% accurate in naming their 
contacts.
3. If the R0 is at the higher end of between two 
and three (e.g., 2.56), contact tracing alone 
will not be effective at mitigating the spread of 
COVID-19. The only viable strategy is 3rd-level 
contact tracing in which respondents will still 
need to be at least 75% accurate.
Sensitivity analysis
Sensitivity analysis is ‘a method that measures how the 
impact of uncertainties of one or more input variables 
can lead to uncertainties on the output variables’ 
(Pichery, 2014). Here, we explore how two input factors 
not initially included in the original model might influence 
prevalence rates: (i) timing of contact tracing and (ii) 
asymptomatic cases. We view these as crucial factors 
because, in real-world settings, it is unclear when 
contact tracing is implemented because of fluctuations 
in receiving back test results and because of resources 
available to do the tracing. Likewise, it is unclear what 
percentage of COVID-19 cases are asymptomatic, 
meaning that asymptomatic individuals are highly 
unlikely to quarantine. In these tests, we manipulate 
the timing of the contact tracing and percent of 
asymptomatic cases while keeping the ideal setting of 
network accuracy at an average of 100% as a constant 
to demonstrate general trends (see Fig. 10).
The results show that the impact of contact 
tracing on the spread of COVID-19 is sensitive to both 
the timing of contact tracing and the percentage of 
symptomatic cases. When R0 = 1.62, there is more time 
to spare at increases in prevalence only take shape 
after the third day. However, this is still dependent on 
the amount of the population that is asymptomatic. 
Once the population is at least 50% asymptomatic, the 
timing nor the method of tracing has little impact as the 
majority of the population will become infected.
In 2nd-level tracing, the impact of timing and 
the R0 can be significantly relaxed, but only if the 
asymptomatic rate is not over 50%. For instance, 
when R0 = 1.62, noticeable differences in prevalence 
do not emerge until the fourth day. In higher R0 
situations (e.g., 2.11), that begins to change to the 
third day. Finally, in even higher R0 situations (e.g., 
2.56), contact tracing seems to be ineffective even if it 
occurs on the same day.
Discussion
Because contact tracing is essentially a form of ENA, 
the current research sought to investigate the impact 
of contact tracing on the spread of COVID-19 through 
an egocentric, agent-based model. After creating 
a basic SEIR model of COVID-19 for three different 
contexts, we manipulated two aspects of contact 
tracing: (i) informant accuracy (i.e., how accurate the 
contact tracing was in eliciting alters) and (ii) level of 
tracing (i.e., the number of snowball waves used). 
Finally, we did a post hoc sensitivity analysis to see 
how the (i) timing of contact tracing and (ii) amount 
of asymptomatic cases influenced the spread of 
COVID-19 as well. Below, we will discuss the results 
in line with research on informant accuracy, best 
practices for collecting egocentric data collection, 
and wider literature regarding contact tracing.
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General informant accuracy levels and 
contact tracing
One general theme of the current results is that 
higher levels of informant accuracy results in better 
mitigation of COVID-19 and less quarantines. How-
ever, how accurate are informants with respect to 
their contacts? This question may be difficult to 
answer because of all the different ways informant 
accuracy is measured, especially in the seminal BKS 
studies. For instance, Bernard et al. (1982) provide 
15 different informant accuracy measures. In the 
context of contact tracing and the current study, the 
most relevant measures are omission errors, which 
Bernard et al. (1982) label as T2: the number people 
not recalled who were actually communicated with 
(i.e., number of true positives). In their electronic 
information exchange system (EIES) study of 57 users 
(i.e., students and scientists) of EIES, the average T2 
percentage was 66%. In other words, the informant 
accuracy rate in line with the current study would only 
be 34%. Contrastingly, in a study of teletype workers 
(Killworth and Bernard, 1976), informant accuracy was 
at about 50%. For reasonable outcomes of COVID-19 
prevalence, this would mean that there would need 
to be mask-wearing and second-level tracing to be 
effective.
However, some contextual variables give reason to 
suspect that informants might be slightly better able 
to remember their contacts during contact tracing. 
Most notably, the BKS studies are often during longer 
periods of time ranging from several weeks to months. 
It can be extremely easy to forget who you may have 
bumped into several months past. On the other hand, 
contact tracing poses short-term, rather than long-
term memory challenges. According to John Hopkins 
Figure 10: Sensitivity analysis on the timing of contact tracing and asymptomatic percent.
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University, typical contact tracing only requires patients 
to remember contacts from the past five to seven days, 
the average incubation period (Gurley, 2020). In any 
case, more research may be needed to gauge typical 
baseline T2 values of informant accuracy for contacts 
from the past several days.
Nevertheless, the current research has demon-
strated that informant accuracy plays a big role 
COVID-19 prevalence and the number of quarantines 
issued. For instance, when the R0 = 1.62, a decrease 
from 75 to 70% informant accuracy jumps from 
under 5% to just over 40% and moves the number 
of quarantines from just under 20% to an unfeasible 
percentage of over 100%. As such, what are some 
ways in which informant accuracy can be improved? 
The next section discusses the current results in line 
with these important efforts.
Strategies to improve informant accuracy: 
moving from states to events
Improving informant accuracy for ENA has long been a 
concern for social network researchers. For instance, 
Hsieh (2014) formalized the retrieval cue approach for 
ENA. This approach assumes that the ‘successful 
recall of an event depends primarily on how well the 
retrieval cues match the event’s representations in 
one’s memory organization’ (p. 3). A retrieval cue is 
any additional piece of information that helps an ego 
remembers a past event. The retrieval cue approach 
mirrors Tulving’s (1974) theory of cue-dependent 
forgetting. This theory assumes that forgetting (i.e., 
the inability to recall something in the present that 
could be recalled in the past) does not mean that the 
memory is lost, but only temporarily inaccessible. In 
Hsieh’s study, participants were randomly assigned 
to a retrieval cue condition in which they were 
instructed to look at their (i) cell phone contact list, 
(ii) last 30 emails, and (iii) friend list on Facebook and 
Twitter as retrieval cues. Hsieh’s results found that 
this approach yielded more contacts than a baseline 
approach.
However, although Hsieh’s (2014) recall aid might 
be a good strategy for remembering relational states, 
it may not be as useful for certain relational events. 
For instance, it is unlikely that a random elevator 
conversational contact would turn up in somebody’s 
cell phone, social media, or e-mail. As such, are there 
certain recall aids that may be better tailored for 
recalling relational events, rather than states?
One possibility may be the context-based recall 
aid designed by Bidart and Charbonneau (2011). 
The context-based name generator begins by asking 
individuals about social context cues in everyday life 
(e.g., work activity, shopping, home life). Then, once 
relevant contexts have been triggered, contact names 
corresponding to those contexts are generated. As 
Bidart and Charbonneau explain, the context-based 
approach is motivated by field theory (Feld, 1981). 
Field theory regards situated action (e.g., activity foci) 
as a key unit of analysis. For instance, if certain activity 
foci can be activated (e.g., transportation), more 
nonchalant relational events might be better able to 
be recalled. Indeed, Pilny and Huber (2021) tested 
three different contact tracing aids and found that the 
context-based instrument significantly elicited more 
contacts and places visited. If informant accuracy 
significantly influences the efficacy of contact tracing, 
then more work is indeed needed to develop recall 
aids more tailored toward relational events, rather 
than relational states.
Second, the timing of contact tracing matters 
greatly. The current results largely replicate the 
models put forth by Kretzschmar et al. (2020), 
who find significant delays in the effectiveness in 
contact tracing even after one day. After three days, 
contact tracing essentially has no effect unless in 
contexts of mask-wearing. This is the case because 
contact tracing is inherently dependent on not just 
quarantining contacts, but when those contacts are 
quarantined. If there is a significant delay, then it 
simply allows those contacts to remain in the system 
and further transmit COVID-19. In other words, the 
damage has already been done.
For applied implications, the results of this study 
strongly suggest that practitioners in charge of training 
contact tracers spend time working with techniques to 
improve informant accuracy. We suggest the following 
techniques to help improve informant accuracy:
•	 Encouraging the use of contextual recall aids 
(e.g., activating relevant foci that puts some-
what random interactions in context).
•	 Improving basic qualitative interview tech-
niques (e.g., the use of probing questions, es-
tablishing rapport and trust).
•	 Implementing contact tracing first to reduce in-
terviewee fatigue.
•	 Clearly establishing the definition of a contact 
to reduce differential interpretation (e.g., inter-
actions within six feet for at least 10 min).
Exploring the potential of multi-level 
tracing
The results of the simulations found that multi-level 
tracing was more effective at reducing the prevalence 
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of COVID-19 than traditional single-level tracing. The 
reasoning seems quite simple. Not only were more 
contacts traced, but these contacts were not just 
random; they were the contacts of the initial contacts. 
That is, in second-level tracing, we contact traced the 
contacts who are at much more risk of contracting 
COVID-19 because they were in contact with someone 
who made contact with an infectious person.
Moreover, multi-level contact tracing was less 
sensitive to informant accuracy, timing, and percent of 
asymptomatic cases. However, is multi-level contact 
tracing practical in real-life? Though some countries 
like South Korea have used versions of multi-level 
tracing (Schneider et al., 2020), they require fast 
implementation in order to be effective. For instance, 
consider if the amount of average contacts is 14 in the 
simulations. Not only does a tracer have to contact to 
those 14 contacts to notify them to quarantine and 
get tested, but the 14 contacts also need to be traced 
as well. Then, the contacts of those 14 contacts need 
to be notified to quarantine and get tested, resulting 
in an additional 196 notifications (i.e., 142).
The growing needs for quicker contact tracing 
have sparked interest in using advanced information 
and communication technologies. For instance, 
smartphones and their applications have been 
utilized to trace contacts and inform individuals 
if they have been near an infected individual with 
Ebola (see Danquah et al., 2019). Contemporarily, 
similar technology is in development by Apple and 
Google to trace the spread of COVID-19 via a phone’s 
Bluetooth (Greenberg, 2020), with other countries, 
such as Singapore, distributing wearable dongles to 
do so (Asher, 2020). While these novel approaches 
are exciting, they are still fraught with complications 
and privacy issues (Danquah et al., 2019). Indeed, 
a recent survey done by Avira found that 71% of 
Americans would not be willing to use a contact 
tracing smartphone application.
Another approach to quickly administer contact 
tracing may be to move the procedure from in-person 
phone calls to electronic surveys. For instance, 
there is a considerable amount of ENA research 
using surveys to collect data on alters going back 
to the General Social Survey (Burt, 1984). However, 
there are still questions as to how reliable surveys 
are compared to the more ‘gold-standard’ method 
of personal interviews. Nevertheless, some recent 
research may be beginning to make progress in this 
vein.
For instance, Hogan et al. (2019) report on the 
efficacy of Network Canvas, a digital egocentric 
network data collection tool designed to help ease 
the burden of collecting such egocentric data. In a 
similar vein, Hollstein et al. (2020) tested four different 
egocentric tools that emphasized visualization. They 
found that most participants preferred concentric 
circles over funnel tools and free designs, even though 
these instruments did not significantly influence 
network size or composition (see also Eddens and 
Fagan, 2018). For multi-level tracing, we recommend 
that researchers continue to explore designing 
electric instruments for egocentric networks, but 
perhaps also pay more attention to completion 
times and effort needed to complete the tracing. As 
the current results show, multi-level tracing is more 
robust against informant accuracy, so accuracy can 
be sacrificed a bit if the instrument can be deployed 
quickly and to many people. For instance, when the 
R0 = 1.62, respondents only need to be about 50% 
accurate in second-level tracing.
Limitations
There are several limitations worth noting. The most 
obvious is that the contact network is largely ‘fixed’ 
and does not follow a stochastic selection process 
that includes endogenous factors like closure/
centralization or exogenous tendencies like mixing 
(e.g., attribute homophily). This is especially notable 
because the social network structure underlying 
any infectious disease is just as important as a 
disease’s biological properties when determining 
how contagious that disease is with metrics like the 
R0 value (Hébert-Dufresne et al., 2020). This suggests 
that the results of the current simulations cannot 
be generalized beyond similar network structures 
reported in Table 2. This is important because 
different contexts, communities, and cities may 
have varying structures of interpersonal contact. For 
instance, de Anda-Jáuregui et al. (2020), using cell 
phone data, report on the contact network of Mexico 
City. And although their results show similar levels 
of centralization and clustering, it was much more 
fragmented (i.e., had lots of separate components). 
Future work may consider how manipulating the 
contact network structure may impact the spread of 
COVID-19 and how contact tracing can be leveraged 
with such general network selection tendencies (e.g., 
Prem et al., 2017).
Finally, beyond the dynamics of the contact 
network, there are still unknowns related to the 
dynamic spread of COVID-19. Various studies have 
reported different R0, secondary transmission rates, 
and growth rates related to COVID-19. Without 
precise values on these transmission dynamics, 
researchers are taking educated guesses as to how 
COVID-19 spreads. Indeed, as the current results 
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suggest, different transmission dynamics, such as 
varying secondary transmission rates, are likely to 
return different results.
Concluding remarks
By now, informant accuracy is a well-known and well-
established issue regarding social egocentric network 
data collection (Corman et al., 2021). Contact tracing 
is a one applied technique of ENA where researchers 
can move beyond merely demonstrating that informant 
accuracy exists, but can begin to investigate the 
consequences of varying levels of informant accuracy. 
The current research shows that informant accuracy 
is critical to controlling the diffusion of an infectious 
disease. Overall, the results suggest that if contact 
tracing is to be effective, it must be fast, accurate, 
and accompanied by other interventions like mask-
wearing to drive down the average R0. Moreover, the 
results show the promise of multi-level tracing because 
it is more robust to lower levels of informant accuracy. 
How researchers and practitioners can deploy fast 
and accurate contact tracing instruments could be a 
vital next step in helping control outbreaks of various 
infectious diseases.
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